I show that every rule for dividing a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) underpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent evaluation profiles does much better.
Introduction.
A principal hires three agents to work together on a project. The principal agrees to pay the team a fixed sum when the project is completed. It must be decided how to allocate the fixed sum among the three agents. The only information available consists of agents' evaluations of the relative contributions of their partners. For example, agent 1 might report that agent 3's contribution was five times as great as agent 2's; agent 2 might report that agent 1's contribution was seven times as great as agent 3's; and agent 3 might report that agent 1's contribution was 35 times as great agent 2's. A rule is needed in the form of a division function that will input the peer evaluations and output the amounts the agents will receive.
Three desirable properties of a division function are exactness, impartiality and consensuality. A division function is exact if it always outputs amounts that add up to the fixed sum; impartial if the amount paid to an agent is independent of that agent's report; 2008) showed that in the three-agent case a division function cannot be exact, impartial and consensual. There remains the problem of choosing a division function that satisfies at most two of the three desirable properties.
We require exactness since in our version of the problem the principal is committed to paying out a fixed sum. We will investigate exact, impartial division functions, which eliminates strategic considerations. In what follows we will determine the extent to which an exact, impartial division function must deviate from consensuality. We will adopt a worst case measure of deviation from consensuality. More exactly, we define the deviation from consensuality of a division function to be the supremum of the absolute value of the difference between the amount assigned to an agent by the given division function and the amount assigned by a consensual division function. Here the supremum is taken over all three agents and over all consistent peer evaluations. We find that the minimum deviation from consensuality for an exact, impartial division function is 1/3. We also produce an exact, impartial division function with that minimal deviation. This division function is also symmetric with respect to agents, and each agent's payoff is increasing in each of her evaluations by her partners.
Dividing a resource of a fixed size among a fixed number of agents is a problem that can take on a number of forms. Thomson (2003) using a rule that depends only on agents' evaluations of their associates. They showed that in the three-agent case there can be no exact, impartial, consensual rule. They also explored exact, impartial, consensual rules for more than three agents. Tideman and Plassman (2008) studied the extent to which the unique impartial, consensual division rule fails to be exact in the three-agent case. Our study can be thought of as complementary to the three-agent section of their paper, since we study the extent to which all impartial, exact division rules fail to be consensual in the three-agent case.
The result establishing 1/3 as the minimal deviation from consensuality of a threeagent exact, impartial division function, and discussion of an example are contained in Section 3, which is preceeded by a preliminary section and followed by some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries.
Three agents complete a project and submit peer evaluations r = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) where Payments are assigned to the agents according to the division function f (r) = (f 1 (r), f 2 (r), f 3 (r)) where 0 ≤ f i (r) < +∞ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Now we set the fixed payment sum at 1 for the sake of simplicity. The division function is exact if f 1 (r) + f 2 (r) + f 3 (r) = 1 for every peer evaluation profile r. The division function f is impartial if for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} agent i's payment f i does not depend on r i . Then we can write
Exact and Impartial Division Functions.
As mentioned above, de Clippel et al. (2008) showed that for three agents a division function cannot be exact, impartial and consensual. We will now investigate exact, impartial division functions to determine the extent to which they must deviate from consensuality.
Suppose f is an exact, impartial division function. Then for (i, j, k) ∈ T = {(1, 2, 3), (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2)} and any peer evaluation profile r,
From (2) we see that if f is an exact, impartial division function, then each f i is additively separable. We also have the following. 2, 3 ). The conclusion follows from (1).
Proposition 1. If f is an exact, impartial division function, then
3 i=1 f i (1, 1) = 1. Proof: Let r i j,k = r j k,i = r k i,j = 1 for (i, j, k) = (1,
Proposition 2. If f is an exact, impartial division function and a
Proof:
By the definition of a division function, the left side of the first equation is at least zero.
Proposition 3. If f is an exact, impartial division function and a
Then summing over T ,
Corollary 1.
If f is an exact, impartial division function, then for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
Proof: Fix > 0 and for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} choose
| : r is a peer evaluation profile and (i, j, k) ∈ T }.
We so define deviation from consensuality because de Clippel et al. (2008) showed that the unique impartial, consensual division function is f i (r) = 1 1+r To see that the bounds in Proposition 2 and 3 and Corollary 1 and especially Corollary 2 are tight, consider the following example.
We have chosen this function because it is the simplest division function satisfying the properties we are about to establish for it. Clearly, F is impartial. That F is exact follows from the fact that for (i, j, k) ∈ T , Finally, we will show that D(F ) = to E(+∞, 0) = 1 3 . Next E(x, +∞) = 
so that E(x, +∞) is decreasing from E(0, +∞) = In summary, the deviation from consensuality for F is 
Concluding Remarks.
Notice that for our division function F , extreme overpayment or underpayment compared to consensual payment occurs only for extreme peer evaluations. For example, the most extreme underpayment of 1 3 occurs only when an agent is rated +∞ compared to both players, and the most extreme overpayment of 1 3 occurs only in the even more unusual case when an agent is rated 0 compared to one associate and +∞ compared to another.
On the other hand, for the less extreme consistent evaluation profile (r cents.
